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ABSTRACT 
 
The Employment Effects of Job Creation Schemes in 
Germany: A Microeconometric Evaluation
∗ 
 
In this paper we evaluate the employment effects of job creation schemes on the participating 
individuals in Germany. Job creation schemes are a major element of active labour market 
policy in Germany and are targeted at long-term unemployed and other hard-to-place 
individuals. Access to very informative administrative data of the Federal Employment 
Agency justifies the application of a matching estimator and allows to account for individual 
(group-specific) and regional effect heterogeneity. We extend previous studies in four 
directions. First, we are able to evaluate the effects on regular (unsubsidised) employment. 
Second, we observe the outcome of participants and non-participants for nearly three years 
after programme start and can therefore analyse mid- and long-term effects. Third, we test 
the sensitivity of the results with respect to various decisions which have to be made during 
implementation of the matching estimator, e.g. choosing the matching algorithm or estimating 
the propensity score. Finally, we check if a possible occurrence of 'unobserved heterogeneity' 
distorts our interpretation. The overall results are rather discouraging, since the employment 
effects are negative or insignificant for most of the analysed groups. One notable exception 
are long-term unemployed individuals who benefit from participation. Hence, one policy 
implication is to address programmes to this problem group more tightly. 
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 1 Introduction
The German labour market is plagued by persistently high unemployment in combination with a
clearly separated situation on the labour markets in West and East Germany. This gets clear looking
at the unemployment rate for 2003, which has been 9.3% in West and 20.1% in East Germany. The
Federal Employment Agency (FEA) spends substantial amounts to overcome this unemployment
problem. A particular emphasis is laid on active labour market policies (ALMP), as the spendings
of 12.3 bn Euro in West Germany and 8.9 bn Euro in East Germany re°ect. The main goal of
ALMP is the permanent integration of unemployed persons into regular employment. ALMP were
¯rst introduced in Germany in the late 1960s and have been gradually adjusted to important changes
on the labour market since then. One major reform step was the introduction of the Social Code III
(Sozialgesetzbuch III) in 1998 as the legal basis for ALMP. Within that reform new instruments were
introduced, competencies were decentralised and a more °exible allocation of funds has been made
possible. Maybe the most important change from an evaluator's point of view was the legal anchoring
of a mandatory output evaluation for all ALMP measures. As a consequence new administrative
datasets have been made accessible for scienti¯c research.1
A major element of ALMP in Germany over the last years have been job creation schemes (JCS),
even though their importance is currently decreasing. JCS have often been criticised because they
lack explicit quali¯cational elements and they might involve `stigma e®ects'.2 However, it can also be
argued that they are a reasonable opportunity for individuals who are not able to re-integrate into
the ¯rst labour market themselves or who do not ¯t the criteria for other programmes, e.g. long-term
unemployed or other hard-to-place individuals. The evaluation of JCS has been impossible for a
long time, since datasets have either not been available or been to small to draw policy relevant
conclusions. However, with the introduction of the Social Code III things have changed and give us
access to a very rich administrative dataset containing more than 11,000 participants in JCS and
a comparison group of nearly 220,000 non-participants. We use this data to answer the question,
if JCS enhance the employment chances of participating individuals. The extensive set of available
individual characteristics in combination with information on the regional labour market situation,
makes the application of a matching estimator possible. Additionally, the large number of participants
allows to account for several sources of e®ect heterogeneity.
The importance of e®ect heterogeneity for the evaluation of JCS in Germany has been well doc-
umented in Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004). Basically, there are two shortcomings to that
study. The ¯rst one refers to an unsatisfying outcome variable, which allows only to monitor if
the individual is registered unemployed or not and does not allow to draw conclusions about the
re-integration success into regular (unsubsidised) employment. A second restriction relates to the
relatively short observation period after programme start, namely two years. This paper extends the
1 The reform process on the German labour market is still ongoing. More reforms are implemented gradually (see
`Modern Services on the Labour Market', Bundesministerium fÄ ur Wirtschaft und Arbeit (2003)). Since we focus in our
empirical analysis on the time period 2000-2002, we are not going to discuss the current reforms here.
2 If the programme is targeted at people with `disadvantages', there is always a risk that a possible employer takes
participation in such schemes as a negative signal concerning the expected productivity or motivation.
1previous analyses in four directions. First, we are able to evaluate the re-integration e®ects of JCS
into regular (unsubsidised) employment. Second, we can monitor the employment status of partici-
pants and non-participants nearly three years after programme start. Third, we test the sensitivity of
the results to various decisions which have to be made whilst implementing the matching estimator,
like the choice of the matching algorithm or the estimation of the propensity score. Finally, we check
if a possible occurrence of `unobserved heterogeneity' or `hidden bias' distorts interpretation of our
results.
The focus of our analysis will be the identi¯cation of individual (group-speci¯c) and regional ef-
fect heterogeneity.3 To do so, we separate the analysis by several characteristics and carry out the
matching analysis on sub-populations.4 Men and women in West and East Germany will be the `main
groups' of our analysis. In addition, we estimate e®ects for eleven `sub-groups' de¯ned by age and
unemployment duration as well as by speci¯c characteristics indicating disadvantages on the labour
market like the lack of professional training or the existence of placement restrictions due to health
problems. The situation on the regional labour market might be a further source of e®ect hetero-
geneity as programme impacts may di®er in regions with high underemployment when compared to
prospering regions. We take that into account by evaluating the programme e®ects with respect to
regional di®erences using the classi¯cation of similar and comparable labour o±ce districts of the
FEA (Blien et al. (2004)).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the following section we describe the insti-
tutional background of JCS in Germany, introduce the dataset used and present some descriptive
statistics. Section 3 explains the general framework for microeconometric evaluation analysis and
section 4 deals with the empirical implementation of the matching estimator. In particular we discuss
the justi¯cation of the matching estimator, the estimation of the propensity scores (section 4.1) and
the choice of the proper matching algorithm (section 4.2) for our situation. Section 4.3 deals with
common support issues, whereas section 4.4 presents some quality indicators for the chosen matching
algorithm. In section 5 we present the results for the main and sub-groups as well as for the re-
gional clusters. Additionally, we also test the sensitivity of our estimates with respect to unobserved
heterogeneity. The ¯nal section concludes and gives some policy recommendations.
2 Institutional Background, Dataset and Selected Descriptives
2.1 Institutional Background
JCS have been the second most important programme (after vocational training) of ALMP in Ger-
many in the last years with respect to the number of participants. JCS can be supported if they
provide the last chance to stabilise and qualify unemployed individuals for later re-integration into
3 In a companion paper, we concentrate on sectoral heterogeneity (Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen, 2004b).
4 There are basically two ways to put greater emphasis on speci¯c variables. One can either ¯nd variables in the
comparison group who are identical with respect to these variables (see e.g. Puhani (1998) or carrying out matching
on sub-populations (see e.g. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) or Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998)).
2regular employment.5 JCS should support activities, which are additional in nature and for the
collective good. Additional in nature means, that the activities could not be executed without the
subsidy. To prevent substitution e®ects and windfall gains, measures with a predominantly com-
mercial purpose have been excluded up to January 2002, when the legal requirements have been
relaxed by a law amendment (`Job-AQTIV-Gesetz'). The majority of activities is conducted in the
public and non-commercial sector. Since JCS are co-¯nanced measures, support is obtained as a
wage subsidy to the employer, covering 30% to 75% of the costs, which is usually paid for twelve
months. Exceptions can be made for a higher subsidy-quota (up to 100%) and a longer duration (up
to 24 months) for persons with strong labour market disadvantages or projects of high priority (see
below). Before January 2002, potential participants had to be long-term unemployed (for more than
one year) or unemployed for at least six of the last twelve months before participation. Furthermore,
they had to ful¯l the requirements for entitlement of unemployment compensation. In addition, the
local placement o±cers were allowed to place up to ¯ve percent of the allocated individuals who did
not meet these conditions (Five-Percent-Quota). Further exceptions are made for young unemployed
(under 25 years) without professional training, short-term unemployed (with at least three months
of unemployment) placed as tutors, and disabled who could be stabilised or quali¯ed.6 Participants
are allowed to do a practical training up to 40% of the time and a vocational training of up to 20%,
together no more than 50% of the programme duration. Priority should be given to projects which
enhance the chances for permanent jobs, support structural improvement in social or environmental
services or aim at the integration of extremely hard-to-place individuals. Participation in JCS results
from placement by the local labour o±ce. Unemployed individuals, who ful¯l the eligibility criteria,
can be o®ered a speci¯c occupation. The responsible caseworker can cancel a running programme at
any time, if the participant can be placed into regular employment. If an unemployed person rejects
the o®er of a JCS or if a participant denies a career counselling by the placement o±cer, the labour
o±ce can stop unemployment bene¯ts at the ¯rst time for up to twelve weeks. If rejections to o®ers
repeat, persons may lose their entitlement for unemployment bene¯ts.
2.2 Dataset
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset merged from several administrative sources of the FEA.7
It contains information on all participants who have started a JCS in February 2000. The sample
of non-participants was drawn from the Job-Seekers-Data-Base (BewA) in January 2000. Hence, it
consists of individuals who have been eligible for participation, but have not entered those schemes
in February 2000. The dataset includes numerous attributes to describe the labour market situation
of the individuals. The information can be categorised into four classes: socio-demographic informa-
tion, like age, gender and marital status, quali¯cation details (work experience, professional training,
5 The legal basis of JCS is xx260-271, 416 Social Code III.
6 With the 2002 amendment, all unemployed individuals can enter a JCS independently of the preceding unemploy-
ment duration, but with restriction that JCS is the only opportunity for occupation. In addition, the Five-Percent-Quota
has been augmented to ten percent.
7 See Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2004a) for more details on the data sources.
3etc.), a short labour market history (durations of last employment and unemployment spells) and
particular programme information (programme sector, programme duration). Since all information
originates from the same sources for participants and non-participants, the dataset provides a good
basis for the construction of a valid comparison group. Furthermore, the large set of attributes
enables the implementation of matching estimators for causal programme evaluation. The dataset
is completed by a FEA characterisation of the regional labour market situation in the labour of-
¯ce districts (Blien et al.(2004)).8 The outcome variable is taken from the Employment Statistics
Register (`BeschÄ aftigtenstatistik', BSt), which contains information on the total population of all
people who are registered in the social security system. These are all regularly employed persons and
participants of several ALMP programmes, but no self-employed or pensioners. Since we treat only
regular (unsubsidised) employment as a success, we use the programme participants master dataset
(`Ma¼nahmeteilnehmergrunddatei', MTG) which contains information on all ALMP programmes by
the FEA, to complete our outcome variable. In our analysis we treat subsidised employment or
participation in ALMP programmes as a failure. Although this de¯nition might con°ict with the
institutional setting, it re°ects the economic point of view to measure the integration ability of JCS
into regular (unsubsidised) employment.9 We observe the labour market outcome for the treatment
and comparison group until December 2002. We exclude information on participants in Berlin.10
Our ¯nal sample consists of 11,151 participants and 219,622 non-participants. Previous empirical
¯ndings have shown that the e®ects of JCS di®er with respect to region and gender (see e.g. Hujer,
Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004)). Thus, we separate our analysis by these aspects, i.e. we estimate the
e®ects separately for men and women in West and East Germany, which are the four `main groups'
of our analysis. Table 1 shows that the largest groups are women (5,035) and men (2,924) in East
Germany. In West Germany, 2,140 men and 1,052 women have started a JCS in February 2000.
Due to the large number of observations in our sample, we are also able to analyse the programme
e®ects for speci¯c problem-groups of the labour market. We evaluate the e®ects separately for three
age categories (younger than 25 years, between 25 and 50 years, and older than 50 years) and for
di®erent unemployment durations (up to 13 weeks, between 13 and 52 weeks, and for more than
52 weeks), as well as for persons without work experience, without professional training and for the
counterfactual group of persons with a high educational degree (college and university graduates).
Furthermore, we analyse the e®ects for rehabilitation attendants, and for individuals for whom the
caseworkers have noted placement restrictions due to health problems. In total we get eleven `sub-
groups' for whom the e®ects will be estimated separately in both regions and for both gender. Table
1 contains the observations in these groups, di®erentiated by participation status. What can be seen
as most important is that nearly all groups contain a reasonable number of participants (> 100),
allowing a proper estimation and interpretation of the e®ects. Groups with less than 100 observations
8 We will discuss the regional information in more detail in appendix B.
9 Only the ¯rst programme participation is evaluated, any participation in later programmes is viewed as an outcome
of the ¯rst treatment and is de¯ned as a failure.
10 The special situation of the labour market in the capital city would require a separate evaluation of the e®ects.
However, the small number of participants aggravates the interpretation of the results. So we decided to exclude Berlin
from our analysis.
4Tab. 1: Number of Observations in Main and Sub-Groups
West Germany East Germany
1
Men Women Men Women
Groups Part.
Non-
Part. Part.
Non-
Part. Part.
Non-
Part. Part.
Non-
Part.
Total (Main group) 2,140 44,095 1,052 34,227 2,924 64,788 5,035 76,512
Age (in years)
<25 years 458 4,102 182 2,443 240 8,743 148 4,864
25-50 years 1,337 23,560 709 19,732 1571 35,927 3,342 44,329
>50 years 345 16,433 161 12,052 1,113 20,118 1,545 27,319
Unemployment duration (in weeks)
<13 weeks 558 12,198 237 7561 578 22,003 575 12,447
13-52 weeks 744 13,909 403 12,235 1,248 22,864 1,970 26,657
>52 weeks 838 17,988 412 14,431 1,098 19,921 2,490 37,408
Without professional experience 273 3,281 159 2,548 293 7,023 498 7945
Without professional training 1,340 21,659 476 17,093 837 14,966 1,121 19,776
With high degree 112 1,486 146 1,165 146 2,682 191 1,619
Rehabilitation attendant 111 2,763 44 1,063 218 4,849 156 3,520
With placement restrictions 354 9,516 148 5,993 394 10,470 376 9,121
1 Observations from the labour o±ce districts of Berlin are excluded.
are excluded from the analysis.
Furthermore, we evaluate the programme e®ects with respect to regional di®erences using the clas-
si¯cation of similar and comparable labour o±ce districts of the FEA (Blien et al. (2004)). This
classi¯cation assigns the 181 labour o±ce districts in Germany to twelve comparable clusters, which
can be summarised into ¯ve clusters for strategic purposes. We use the coarser classi¯cation for
strategic purposes for Western Germany (four clusters). Since all (except one) labour o±ce districts
in East Germany belong to the ¯rst cluster for strategic purposes, we use the ¯ner classi¯cation of
three clusters for Eastern Germany. Table B.1 in appendix B describes the characteristics of each
cluster and presents the number of labour o±ce districts as well as the number of participants in each
cluster. The largest number of observations can be found in cluster Ib, where 53.1% of all female and
36.1% of all male participants are located. The smallest number of participants is found in cluster
IV with only 3.6% of the male and 1.3% of the female participants.
2.3 Selected Descriptives for the Main Groups and the Regional Clusters
Descriptives for the Main Groups: Table A.1 in appendix A shows selected descriptive statistics
for the `main groups' di®erentiated by participation status. The variables are measured at the begin
of the programme in February 2000. Whereas the numbers from table 1 have shown that more
individuals participate in East Germany, the individual attributes show regional di®erences, too,
and we will describe the most important ones. First of all it is worth noting that participants in
West Germany are on average younger than non-participants. While participating men in West
Germany are on average 37.2 years old at programme begin, the non-participants are on average
43.2 years old. The same proportion holds for women in West Germany, where the participants
are 37.8 years and the non-participants 43.3 years. In contrast to that, participating men in East
5Germany are older (44.5 years vs. 41.7 years) than non-participants, whereas participating women
in East Germany are approximately the same age (44 years) as their respective counterparts in the
comparison group. Clear di®erences between participants and non-participants can be found in the
number of (unsuccessful) placement propositions, which is much higher for participants and can be
seen as an indicator for a more problematic placement process of the participants. Participating
men (women) in West Germany have on average 7.7 (6.9) placement propositions, whereas the
corresponding number in the group of non-participants is only 3.6 (3.0). In East Germany we get a
similar picture, where participating men (women) have on average 6.1 (5.4) placement propositions,
whereas non-participating men (women) have 3.0 (2.8). However, concluding from these ¯gures that
allocation of individuals to JCS is target-oriented to speci¯c problem groups of the labour market,
is not straightforward. This becomes clear when looking at the variable placement restrictions. It
indicates the reduced placement opportunities due to individual health restrictions noted by the local
placement o±cers. It re°ects the caseworker's assessment of the individual's situation and is often
used to identify the need of an individual for further assistance. It is quite interesting to note, that the
share of people with placement restrictions is higher in the group of non-participants independently
of region and gender. Additionally, individuals in the treatment group have in general fewer health
restrictions, which complements the above statement. Another interesting di®erence between East
and West Germany becomes obvious regarding the quali¯cation variables. In the Western part the
majority of participants does not have a completed professional training (62% of the men, 45%
of the women), whereas the numbers in East Germany are much lower. In East Germany only
around 28% (22%) of the participating men (women) do not have a completed professional training.
Within the regions and gender, no large di®erences emerge between participants and non-participants.
One exception are men in West Germany, where the share of non-participants without professional
training lies around 49% and is much lower compared to the share of participants. With respect to
work experience, no signi¯cant di®erences can be found between participants and non-participants in
East Germany - the share of people with work experience is around 90% - whereas in West Germany
participating men (87%) and women (85%) have on average less work experience compared to their
counterparts in the comparison group (men and women: 93%). Clearly, both points (quali¯cation
and work experience) have to be seen in conjunction with the age of participants which is lower in
West Germany. Turning back to table 1 shows, that the share of participants below 25 years is 21.4%
(17.3%) for men (women) in West Germany and only 8.2% (2.9%) for men (women) in East Germany.
This may indicate a di®erent purpose of JCS in both regions, where JCS are more target-oriented
(e.g. for young unemployed without professional training) in West-Germany and also used to relieve
the tense situation on the labour market in East Germany.
Descriptives for the Regional Clusters: As mentioned above we di®erentiate our analysis be-
tween ¯ve clusters of labour o±ce districts, where cluster I districts are sub-categorised into three
classes. This leaves us with seven clusters for the analysis for which the e®ects will be estimated
6separately.11 Tables A.2 (clusters Ia, Ib and Ic) and A.3 (clusters II-V) in appendix A present se-
lected descriptives for participants and non-participants in these clusters. Starting with the results
for the clusters in East Germany, it is quite interesting to note that the number of placement propo-
sitions varies considerably between the clusters. For example, participating men in cluster Ia (worst
labour market conditions in East Germany) have on average 5.1 placement propositions, whereas
participating men in cluster Ic (best labour market conditions in East Germany) have on average 7.2
propositions. For women in these clusters the same tendency emerges with 4.8 placement propositions
in cluster Ia and 6.3 propositions in cluster Ic. Additionally, it becomes obvious that independently
of gender, in districts with a bad labour market environment the average programme duration is
longer than in districts with a better environment. Men and women in districts of cluster Ia remain
in programmes on average for 336.4 and 345.2 days, whereas they remain only 295.2 and 304.9 day in
cluster Ic. Considering the shares of participants without professional training shows, that in a better
labour market environment a higher share of participants belong to this group. Taken together, this
may be seen as an indication for di®erent purposes in the implementation of programmes. In labour
o±ce districts, where the labour market has only the slightest dynamics and is also characterised by
high underemployment, JCS are used to relieve this tense labour market situation. In regions with
more dynamics, allocation to JCS is more likely to follow the postulations from the law and hence
is more target-oriented to speci¯c problem groups of the labour market. Turning to the results for
clusters II to V in table A.3 shows that this ¯nding does not hold for participants in the primarily
West German districts. Here, the share of persons without professional training is higher in districts
with worse opportunities. However, this may be caused by the fact that in regions with better labour
market conditions and consequently lower unemployment other programmes (e.g. vocational train-
ing) are o®ered. Therefore, the share of participants without professional training is lower in those
districts. Additionally, for cluster II to V it can also be seen that the share of short-term unemployed
persons increases with the situation on the labour market. Whereas in cluster II approximately
22% (19%) of the participating and non-participating men (women) are short-term unemployed, the
share of short-term unemployed in cluster V ranges from 24.8% (participating women) to nearly 40%
(non-participating men).
3 The Estimation of Treatment E®ects with Matching Estimators
The Potential Outcome Framework and Selection Bias Since we work with non-experimental
data, we have to deal with some identifying issues. As we consider only one speci¯c programme
compared to non-participation, we can use the potential outcome framework with two potential
outcomes Y 1 (individual receives treatment) and Y 0 (individual does not receive treatment).12 The
actually observed outcome for any individual i can be written as: Yi = Y 1
i ¢ Di + (1 ¡ Di) ¢ Y 0
i ,
where D 2 f0;1g is a binary treatment indicator. The treatment e®ect for each individual i is then
11 See appendix B for additional information on the classi¯cation.
12 The potential outcome framework is variously attributed to Fisher (1935), Neyman (1935), Roy (1951), Quandt
(1972, 1988) or Rubin (1974), but most often it is just called the Roy-Rubin-model (RRM).
7de¯ned as the di®erence between her potential outcomes ¢i = Y 1
i ¡ Y 0
i . Since there will be never
an opportunity to estimate individual e®ects with con¯dence, we have to concentrate on population
averages of gains from treatment. The most prominent evaluation parameter is the so called average
treatment e®ect on the treated (ATT), which focuses explicitly on the e®ects on those for whom the
programme is actually intended. It is given by:
ATT = E(¢ j D = 1) = E(Y 1 j D = 1) ¡ E(Y 0 j D = 1): (1)
In the sense that this parameter focuses directly on actual treatment participants, it determines
the realised gross gain from the programme and can be compared with its costs, helping to decide
whether the programme is a success or not (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Given equation
(1) the problem of selection bias is straightforward to see, since the second term on the right hand
side is unobservable. If the condition E(Y 0 j D = 1) = E(Y 0 j D = 0) holds, we can use the
non-participants as an adequate comparison group. However, with non-experimental data it will
usually not hold. Consequently, estimating the ATT by the di®erence in the subpopulation means
of participants E(Y 1 j D = 1) and non-participants E(Y 0 j D = 0) will lead to a selection bias,
since participants and non-participants are selected groups that would have di®erent outcomes even
in absence of the programme. This bias may come from observable factors like age or skill di®erences
or unobservable factors like motivation. For both cases di®erent estimation strategies are available.13
If we are willing to assume that selection occurs on observed characteristics only, the matching
estimator is an appealing choice. Its basic idea is to search from a large group of non-participants
those individuals who are similar to the treated group in all relevant (observable) characteristics.14
How Does Matching Solve the Evaluation Problem? Matching is based on the identifying
assumption that, conditional on some covariate X, the outcome Y is independent of D. It is well
known that matching on X can become hazardous when X is of high dimension (`curse of dimension-
ality'). To deal with this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of
balancing scores b(X), i.e. functions of the relevant observed covariates X such that the conditional
distribution of X given b(X) is independent of the assignment to treatment, that is X qDjb(X). For
participants and non-participants with the same balancing score, the distributions of the covariates
X are the same, i.e. they are balanced across the groups. The propensity score P(X), i.e. the proba-
bility of participating in a programme is one possible balancing score. It summarises the information
of the observed covariates X into a single index function. The propensity score can be seen as the
coarsest balancing score whereas X is the ¯nest (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The authors also
show that if treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given X, it is also strongly ignorable given
any balancing score. Hence, it is su±cient to assume that (in the notation of Dawid (1979)):
Assumption 1 Unconfoundedness for Controls given the Propensity Score:
Y 0 q DjP(X);
13 See Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Angrist and Krueger (1999) or Blundell and Costa-Dias (2002) for
overviews.
14 See Imbens (2004) or Smith and Todd (2005) for recent overviews regarding matching methods.
8where q denotes independence. If assumption 1 is ful¯lled, the non-participant outcomes have,
conditional on P(X), the same distribution that participants would have experienced if they had not
participated in the programme (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). Similar to randomisation in a
classical experiment, matching balances the distributions of all relevant pre-treatment characteristics
X in the treatment and comparison group, and thus achieves independence between the potential
outcomes and the assignment to treatment. Hence, if the mean exists,
E(Y 0 j X;D = 1) = E(Y 0 j X;D = 0) = E(Y 0 j X)
and the missing counterfactual mean can be constructed from the outcomes of non-participants.
In order for both sides of the equations to be well de¯ned simultaneously for all X, it is usually
additionally assumed that
Assumption 2 Weak Overlap:
Pr(D = 1 j X) < 1;
for all X. This implies that the support of X is equal in both groups, i.e. S = Support(XjD = 1) =
Support(XjD = 0). These assumptions are su±cient for identi¯cation of (1), because the moments
of the distribution of Y 1 for the treated are directly estimable.15 The method of matching can also
be used to estimate the ATT at some points X = x, where x is a particular realisation of X:
ATT(X = x) = E(¢ j X = x;D = 1) = E(Y 1 j X = x;D = 1) ¡ E(Y 0 j X = x;D = 1): (2)
This parameter measures the mean treatment e®ect for persons who were randomly drawn from the
population of the treated given a speci¯c realisation of certain characteristics X. This is of particular
interest for us, since we want to estimate the e®ects for sub-groups, like long-term unemployed persons
or individuals without work experience.
4 Implementation of the Matching Estimator
After having decided to use matching estimators for evaluation purposes, the researcher is confronted
with several questions regarding the implementation of these estimators.16 Every evaluation task
requires a careful consideration of the available choices for the given situation. Hence, we will discuss
the implementation and justi¯cation of the matching estimator in our context in the next subsections.
We start with the plausibility of CIA in our context. Since the number of covariates in the data makes
the use of covariate matching unfeasible, we rely on propensity score matching. To do so, we have
to consider the correct model and the choice of relevant variables for the participation probability.
Following that, we choose one matching algorithm to be used in the further analysis. Subsections
4.3 and 4.4 will be concerned with common support and matching quality issues.
15 To identify the average treatment e®ect (ATE), additional assumptions are required.
16 Caliendo (2005) provides an extensive overview of the issues arising when implementing matching estimators. He
also discusses e±ciency issues when choosing between di®erent matching algorithms.
94.1 Plausibility of CIA and Propensity Score Estimation
Before estimating the propensity scores, we have to consider the plausibility of the CIA in our
context brie°y. As already noted, for the CIA to be ful¯lled we need to condition on all variables
that jointly in°uence the participation decision and the outcome variable. Our dataset (see section
2.2) contains a rich set of variables, including socio-demographic variables, information about the
quali¯cational background and the labour market history of individuals. The latter point is most
important since previous empirical studies have emphasised the importance of the labour market
history (see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999)). Finally, the situation on the regional labour
market is accounted for by using the FEA-clusters as described in section 2.3. Given this informative
dataset we argue henceforth that the CIA holds. We test the sensitivity of our estimates to this
assumption using a bounding analysis in section 5.
Estimation of the propensity scores requires two choices to be made: First, the choice of an adequate
model and second, the selection of variables to be included in this model. Little advice is available
regarding which functional form to use (see e.g. Smith (1997)). In principle any discrete choice model
can be used. Preference for logit or probit models (compared to linear probability models) derives
from the well-known shortcomings of the linear probability model. For the binary treatment case,
where we estimate the probability of participation vs. non-participation, logit and probit models
usually yield similar results. Hence, the choice is not too critical. Since the logit distribution has
more density mass in the bounds that re°ects our situation better, it will be used for estimation.
More advice is available regarding the inclusion (or exclusion) of covariates in the propensity score
model. The matching strategy builds on CIA, requiring that the outcome variable(s) must be inde-
pendent of treatment conditional on the propensity score. Therefore, implementing matching requires
choosing a set of variables X that credibly satis¯es this condition. Only variables that simultaneously
in°uence the participation decision and the outcome variable should be included. Hence, economic
theory, a sound knowledge of previous research and also information about the institutional settings
should guide the researcher in building up the model (see e.g. Smith and Todd (2005) or Sianesi
(2004)). Furthermore, it should be clear that only variables that are una®ected by participation (or
the anticipation of it) should be included in the model. Economic theory gives some guidance on
which variables to choose. The accumulated evidence in the evaluation literature points out that
the labour market history of individuals and the regional labour market environment are crucial
variables to be included in the estimation (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). In cases of uncer-
tainty of the proper speci¯cation, the question might arise if it is better to include too many rather
than too few variables. Bryson, Dorsett, and Purdon (2002) note that there are two reasons why
over-parameterised models should be avoided. First, it may be the case that including extraneous
variables in the participation model exacerbate the support problem. Second, although the inclusion
of insigni¯cant variables will not bias the estimates or make them inconsistent, it may increase their
variance. Rubin and Thomas (1996) on the other hand recommend against `trimming' models in
the name of parsimony. They argue that a variable should only be excluded from analysis if there is
consensus that the variable is either unrelated to the outcome or not a proper covariate. By these
10Tab. 2: Hit-Rates and Pseudo-R2 for Di®erent Propensity Score Speci¯cations 1
Speci¯cation West Germany East Germany
(Sets of Variables included) Men Women Men Women
Socio-
Demogr.
2
Quali¯ca-
tion
3 Career
4 Region
5
Hit-
Rate R
2
Hit-
Rate R
2
Hit-
Rate R
2
Hit-
Rate R
2
x 55.20 0.036 64.51 0.050 44.46 0.014 54.47 0.019
x 61.03 0.033 76.19 0.036 59.10 0.014 67.29 0.013
x 73.21 0.106 79.45 0.130 76.64 0.106 72.70 0.097
x 54.00 0.000 81.67 0.001 63.69 0.000 73.95 0.000
x x 62.60 0.062 67.29 0.076 58.12 0.030 55.18 0.030
x x 68.81 0.122 73.03 0.153 74.56 0.116 72.20 0.105
x x 55.21 0.036 65.31 0.051 45.64 0.014 54.11 0.019
x x 69.74 0.123 78.09 0.153 75.36 0.110 72.61 0.106
x x 61.40 0.033 74.63 0.037 55.98 0.014 67.60 0.013
x x 72.62 0.106 77.01 0.133 76.26 0.106 72.81 0.098
x x x 70.65 0.138 75.53 0.174 74.28 0.122 72.18 0.113
x x x 62.61 0.062 67.26 0.077 57.94 0.030 55.28 0.030
x x x 68.97 0.123 73.23 0.157 74.51 0.117 72.12 0.106
x x x 69.99 0.124 77.51 0.156 75.12 0.111 72.69 0.107
x x x x 70.60 0.139 75.70 0.177 74.20 0.122 72.24 0.114
1 Hit-rates are computed in the following way: If the estimated propensity score is larger than the sample proportion of persons
taking treatment, i.e. ^ P(X) > P, observations are classi¯ed as '1'. If ^ P(X) · P observations are classi¯ed as '0'.
2 Socio-demographic variables include age, age2, marital status, number of children, nationality (german=1) and health restric-
tions.
3 Quali¯cation variables include professional training, occupational group, professional rank and work experience.
4 Career variables include duration of last employment and unemployment, number of placement propositions, last contact to
job center, rehabilitation attendants, placement restrictions and previous labour market programmes.
5 Regional variables consist of the seven clusters de¯ned by the FEA as discussed in 2.3.
criteria, there are both reasons for and against including all covariates available.
But clearly, there are also some formal (statistical) tests which can be used. Table 2 contains the
results for two tests, namely the hit-rate and the pseudo-R2. With the `hit or miss'-method or
prediction rate metric (suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) and Heckman
and Smith (1999)), variables are chosen to maximise the within-sample correct prediction rates,
assuming that the costs for the misclassi¯cation are equal for the two groups (Heckman, Ichimura,
and Todd, 1997).17 This method classi¯es an observation as `1' if the estimated propensity score is
larger than the sample proportion of persons taking treatment, i.e. ^ P(X) > P, and else as `0'. The
pseudo-R2 indicates how well the regressors X explain the participation probability.
Both statistics have been estimated for several speci¯cations of the model. We have started with
base speci¯cations, containing only the variables of one of the four above mentioned categories.
Using this as a starting point, we added another category of variables. For example, the ¯rst line
of table 2 shows the results for a model speci¯cation where only the socio-demographic variables are
included. The results in line 5 are for a model with socio-demographic and quali¯cational variables.
Testing all possible combinations of two and three categories and ¯nally using all information gives
us 15 speci¯cations for the four main groups. One shortcoming of such statistical tests becomes
obvious from the results. If we take for example the results for women in West Germany we see
17 See e.g. Breiman, Friedman, Olsen, and Stone (1984) for theory and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998)
or Smith and Todd (2005) for applications.
11that the best hit-rate (81.7%) is achieved by only including the regional dummy variables. With
the full speci¯cation we achieve only a hit-rate of 75.7%. Following that rule would mean that
we should estimate the propensity score solely based on the model with regional dummy variables.
This makes no economic sense since obviously important characteristics, e.g. age and quali¯cation
variables, would be excluded. It has to be kept in mind that the main purpose of the propensity score
estimation is not to predict selection into treatment as well as possible but to balance all covariates
(Augurzky and Schmidt, 2000). The Pseudo-R2 shows that the full speci¯cation does the best job
in explaining the participation probability. For the other three groups the ¯ndings are similar. The
full speci¯cation does the best job in terms of R2. However, even though the hit-rates are above 70%
for the full speci¯cation, there are some speci¯cations with higher hit-rates.
Considering these ¯ndings and bearing in mind that we see no economic reasons for excluding sets
of variables, we use the full speci¯cation for the estimation of the propensity scores. Table A.4 in
appendix A contains the results of the propensity score estimation. Looking at this table clari¯es
that the in°uence of variables on the participation probability di®ers by regions and gender. The
coe±cients of the socio-demographic variables show that the participation probability of men in
West Germany decreases with age, while in East Germany older men and women are more likely
to participate. This indicates once again the slightly di®erent purpose of the programmes in East
and West Germany. Especially in East Germany, JCS function as a relief for the labour market
and are used as a bridge to retirement. Furthermore, it has to be noted that Germans are more
likely to participate than foreigners. This may be due to the fact that other measures of ALMP
(e.g. language courses) are preferred for foreigners. Health restrictions also increase the individual
participation probability independently of the region which indicates an allocation according to the
de¯nitions by law.
The coe±cients for the quali¯cation characteristics emphasise gender speci¯c di®erences in the allo-
cation. A higher quali¯cation (compared to the reference category `without completed professional
training and common-school exam') increases the participation probability for women in both parts,
while the e®ects for men are insigni¯cant or negative. It can be assumed that it is for unemployed
women with higher quali¯cation harder than for higher quali¯ed unemployed men to end their un-
employment and so they are more likely to participate in JCS. Previous work experience reduces
the participation probability for all groups. This was expected, since work experience is generally
an important criterion for placement into regular employment. As unemployment duration is an
eligibility criterion for participation, its in°uence is of major importance. We included unemploy-
ment duration in three categories and the participation probability increases with unemployment
duration. The number of (unsuccessful) placement propositions is an indicator for bad labour mar-
ket opportunities. A higher number of placement propositions corresponds to a higher participation
probability, which indicates that allocation is done according to the law. A last interesting point to
note is that placement restrictions annotated by the caseworker harm the participation probability.
This is somewhat surprising, because JCS should also be o®ered to these groups. The coe±cients
for the regional context are in reference to the labour o±ce districts with the best (in relation to the
12region) labour market environment. The coe±cients are insigni¯cant for women in East Germany.
For men in East Germany we ¯nd a signi¯cant negative e®ect for individuals from clusters Ib and Ic.
Living in labour o±ce districts belonging to cluster II, III and IV (II, III) reduces the participation
probability for women (men) in West Germany (compared to cluster V). We will use the estimated
propensity scores in the following to implement the matching estimator.
4.2 Choosing the Matching Algorithm
After having speci¯ed the propensity score model, the next choice to be made concerns the matching
algorithm to be used. Several algorithms have been suggested in the literature. Good overviews can
be found in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998), Smith and Todd (2005) or Caliendo (2005).
Clearly, all approaches should yield asymptotically the same results, because with growing sample
size all of them become closer to comparing only exact matches (Smith, 2000). However, in small
samples the choice of the matching approach can be important (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997).
All matching estimators contrast the outcome of a treated individual with the outcome of comparison
group members. However, the estimators di®er not only in the de¯nition of the neighbourhood for
each treated individual and the handling of the common support problem, but also with respect to
the weights given to these neighbours. Usually a trade-o® between bias and variance arises. First,
one has to decide on how many non-treated individuals to match to a single treated individual.
Nearest-neighbour (NN) matching only uses the participant and its closest neighbour. Therefore it
minimises the bias but might also involve an e±ciency loss, since a large number of close neigbours
is disregarded. Clearly, NN matching faces the risk of bad matches, if the closest neighbour is far
away. This can be avoided by using caliper matching, i.e. imposing a tolerance on the maximum
distance in the propensity scores allowed. Kernel-based matching on the other hand uses more (all)
non-participants for each participant, thereby reducing the variance but possibly increasing the bias.
Finally, using the same non-treated individual more than once (NN matching with replacement)
can possibly improve the matching quality, but increases the variance.18 Kernel matching is not
feasible for our estimation, since the computing time is too high. However, to see if the inclusion
of more comparison units for the construction of the counterfactual outcome has in°uence on the
estimated e®ects, we also use `oversampling' methods. This form of matching involves a trade-o®
between variance and bias, too. It trades reduced variance, resulting from using more information
to construct the counterfactual for each participant, with increased bias that results from poorer
matches on average (Smith and Todd, 2005).19
18 This is of particular interest with data where the distribution of the propensity score is very di®erent in the treatment
and the comparison group. For example if we have a lot of treated individuals with high propensity scores, but only
few comparison individuals with high propensity scores, we get bad matches as some of the high-score participants will
get matched to low-score non-participants. This can be overcome by allowing replacement, which in turn reduces the
number of distinct participants used to construct the counterfactual outcome and thereby increases the variance of the
estimator (Smith and Todd, 2005). Another problem which is related to NN matching without replacement is that the
estimates depend on the order in which observations get matched.
19 When using oversampling, one has to decide how many matching partners m should be chosen for each individual
i and which weight should be assigned to them. We will use uniform weights, that is all the m comparison individuals
within set Ai receive the weight
1
m, whereas all other individuals from the comparison group receive the weight zero.
13Tab. 3: The E®ects in the Main Groups for Di®erent Matching
Algorithms1,2
West Germany Men Women
Matching Algorithm E®ect S.E. Obs.
3 E®ect S.E. Obs.
3
NN without replacement -0.0005 0.0108 2,132 0.0554 0.0200 1,028
caliper 0.01 -0.0028 0.0137 2,119 0.0451 0.0213 975
caliper 0.02 -0.0019 0.0158 2,123 0.0459 0.0258 980
caliper 0.05 -0.0009 0.0128 2,131 0.0479 0.0223 1,002
NN with replacement 0.0061 0.0110 2,140 0.0504 0.0231 1,052
caliper 0.01 0.0042 0.0139 2,132 0.0504 0.0233 1,051
caliper 0.02 0.0056 0.0150 2,139 0.0504 0.0211 1,052
caliper 0.05 0.0061 0.0133 2,140 0.0504 0.0207 1,052
Oversampling
2 NN 0.0023 0.0140 2,140 0.0466 0.0221 1,052
5 NN 0.0011 0.0106 2,140 0.0529 0.0161 1,052
10 NN -0.0003 0.0100 2,140 0.0610 0.0180 1,052
East Germany Men Women
Matching Algorithm E®ect S.E. Obs.
3 E®ect S.E. Obs.
3
NN without replacement -0.0291 0.0080 2,924 -0.0135 0.0075 5,032
caliper 0.01 -0.0289 0.0085 2,908 -0.0137 0.0070 5,026
caliper 0.02 -0.0287 0.0088 2,923 -0.0135 0.0064 5,027
caliper 0.05 -0.0291 0.0101 2,924 -0.0135 0.0076 5,027
NN with replacement -0.0294 0.0112 2,924 -0.0193 0.0063 5,035
caliper 0.01 -0.0294 0.0086 2,924 -0.0191 0.0069 5,031
caliper 0.02 -0.0294 0.0092 2,924 -0.0193 0.0075 5,032
caliper 0.05 -0.0294 0.0105 2,924 -0.0193 0.0081 5,034
Oversampling
2 NN -0.0250 0.0090 2,924 -0.0128 0.0073 5,035
5 NN -0.0237 0.0065 2,924 -0.0101 0.0055 5,035
10 NN -0.0249 0.0076 2,924 -0.0106 0.0038 5,035
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1%-level, italic letters refer to the
5%-level. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 50 replications.
1 Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching without replacement uses each non-
participant only once, whereas with NN matching with replacement each non-
participant can be used repeatedly. Caliper de¯nes the maximal allowed dif-
ference in the propensity score of participants and matched non-participants.
2 Matching is implemented with the Stata module PSMATCH2 by Leuven and
Sianesi (2003).
3 Obs. is the number of participants after matching.
This brief discussion makes clear that even with NN matching several alternatives emerge. It seems
reasonable to try a number of approaches and test the sensitivity of the results with respect to the
algorithm choice. If they give similar results, the choice may be unimportant. Else, if the results di®er,
further investigation may be needed in order to reveal more about the source of the disparity (Bryson,
Dorsett, and Purdon, 2002). We implement eleven matching algorithms, including NN matching
without replacement (without caliper and with calipers of 0.01, 0.02 and 0.05) and NN matching
with replacement with the same calipers. To see if the estimates di®er when more neighbours are
included, we additionally implement oversampling with 2, 5 and 10 nearest neighbours.20
Table 3 contains the results for the main groups for the last month of the observation period. Bold
letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1%-level, italic letters refer to the 5%-level, standard errors are
bootstrapped with 50 replications. The estimates illustrate two points: First of all, the results are not
sensitive to the chosen matching algorithm. For men in West Germany the e®ects are insigni¯cant
20 Matching is implemented using the STATA module PSMATCH2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
14and centered around zero. For men in East Germany the signi¯cant e®ects vary between -2.37%
(5-NN-Matching) and -2.94% (NN with replacement). This means that the employment rate of men
in East Germany, who started their JCS in February 2000, is in December 2002 on average between
2.37% and 2.94% lower when compared to matched non-participants. We will give an extensive
interpretation of the results in the next section and restrict the discussion here to sensitivity issues.
The signi¯cant e®ects for females in East Germany vary between -1.06% (10 NN) and -1.93% (NN
with replacement). The only group for whom a somewhat higher variation in the e®ects is detected
are women in West Germany, where the lowest estimated e®ect is 4.51% (NN without replacement
and without caliper) and the highest estimated e®ect is 6.1% (10 NN). The second point to note
is that the standard errors are (as expected) in general lower for the oversampling algorithms, even
though the di®erences here are not very pronounced. Hence, the choice of the matching algorithm
seems not to be a critical issue in our case. The results show that the estimates are not sensitive to
the algorithm choice and that the improvement which comes from oversampling methods in terms of
reduced variance is limited only. Therefore, we decide to use NN matching for the further analysis.
Since we have a very large sample of non-participants, the probability of ¯nding good matches without
using replacement is quite high. To avoid an unnecessary in°ation of the variance, we match without
replacement. Finally, to ensure a good matching quality, we implement a caliper of 0.02. This is
mostly driven by the ¯nding for women in West Germany, where imposing this caliper reduces the
number of treated observations by approximately 4.6% of the sample. In turn, this means that if
we did not impose this caliper, the distance in the propensity scores would be higher than 0.02 for
4.6%. For the other groups, imposing the caliper does not have much in°uence. Henceforth, we use
NN matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02 for the analysis.
4.3 Common Support
Before assessing the matching quality, it is important to check the overlap or common support region
for participants and non-participants. The most straightforward way is a visual analysis of the density
distribution of the propensity score in both groups. The results can be found in ¯gures A.1 to A.4
in appendix A. The left hand side of each graph shows the propensity score distribution for the
non-participants, the right hand side refers to the participants in each group. Taking for instance the
results of men in West Germany (¯gure A.1), it can be seen that the distribution for non-participants
is highly skewed to the left in nearly all of the sub-groups. Problems arise, when the distributions
in both groups do not overlap. A good example are short-term unemployed men in West Germany,
where quite a large amount of observations in the treatment group has a propensity score over 0.5
and nearly none of the comparison individuals can be found in this region.
There are several ways of imposing the common support condition, e.g. by `minima and maxima
comparison' or `trimming' (see Caliendo (2005) for an overview). We impose the `minima and maxima
condition' and additionally implement NN matching with a caliper of 0.02. The idea of minima-
maxima comparison is to delete all treated observations, whose propensity score is smaller than the
minimum and higher than the maximum in the comparison group. Treated individuals who fall
15outside the common support region have to be disregarded and for these individuals the treatment
e®ect cannot be estimated. Bryson, Dorsett, and Purdon (2002) note that if the proportion of lost
individuals is small, this poses few problems. However, if the number is too large, there may be
concerns whether the estimated e®ect on the remaining individuals can be viewed as representative.
Tab. 4: Number of Treated Individuals Lost Due to Common
Support Requirement1,2
West Germany Men Women
Before After Lost Before After Lost
Matching in % Matching in %
Total 2140 2123 0.79 1052 980 6.84
Age (in years)
<25 458 434 5.24 182 162 10.99
25-50 1337 1328 0.67 709 663 6.49
>50 345 344 0.29 161 150 6.83
Duration of unemployment
< 13 weeks 558 440 21.15 237 189 20.25
13-52 weeks 744 720 3.23 403 365 9.43
> 52 weeks 838 835 0.36 412 400 2.91
Without professional experience 273 247 9.52 159 128 19.50
Without professional training 1340 1296 3.28 476 447 6.09
With high degree 112 96 14.29 146 120 17.81
Rehabilitation attendant 111 100 9.91 44 35 20.45
With placement restrictions 354 326 7.91 148 117 20.95
East Germany Men Women
Before After Lost Before After Lost
Matching in % Matching in %
Total 2924 2923 0.03 5035 5027 0.16
Age (in years)
<25 240 229 4.58 148 144 2.70
25-50 1571 1570 0.06 3342 3335 0.21
>50 1113 1074 3.50 1545 1481 4.14
Duration of unemployment
< 13 weeks 578 467 19.20 575 431 25.04
13-52 weeks 1248 1230 1.44 1970 1963 0.36
> 52 weeks 1098 1098 0.00 2490 2490 0.00
Without professional experience 293 289 1.37 498 489 1.81
Without professional training 837 835 0.24 1121 1116 0.45
With high degree 146 136 6.85 191 164 14.14
Rehabilitation attendant 218 215 1.38 156 148 5.13
With placement restrictions 394 371 5.84 376 362 3.72
1 We used the minima-maxima restriction as common support condition.
2 Results refer to a NN matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02.
Table 4 contains the number of treated individuals lost in each of the sub-groups. It can be seen that
the number of lost individuals is fairly low for three of the main groups. For men in West Germany we
lose 0.79% of the observations, for men (0.03%) and women (0.16%) in East Germany the proportion
is even smaller. However, for women in West Germany we cannot ¯nd similar non-participants for
around 6.84% of the treated population and have to discard these individuals. Figure A.2 makes
very clear that the overlap between participating and non-participating women in West Germany is
fairly limited in the sub-groups, too. As a consequence, we there lose up to 20.95% of the treated
population (for women with placement restrictions). Hence, interpretation of the e®ects has to be
made careful.
16For the other sub-groups the share of lost individuals is acceptable. However, two sub-groups are
problematic for both gender and regions. The ¯rst are short-term unemployed persons (less than
13 weeks unemployed). For this group we lose 21.15% of the participating men in West Germany,
19.20% of men and 25.04% of women in East Germany. This means that we are not able to ¯nd
short-term unemployed individuals in the comparison group that have similar propensity scores as
the treated individuals. For women in East Germany this gets very clear when looking at ¯gure
A.4 for the short-term unemployed. Whereas the density of observations for the non-participants is
very low above 0.2, participants can be found even at scores close to 1. The second sub-group are
individuals with high degree. For this sub-group the share of lost individuals is 6.85% (14.14%) for
men (women) in East Germany and 14.29% (17.81%) for men (women) in West Germany. Overall,
we note that the share of lost individuals is rather small in East Germany, higher for men in West
Germany and highest for women in West Germany.
4.4 Matching Quality
Matching Quality for the Main Groups Since we do not condition on all covariates but on
the propensity score, we have to check the ability of the matching procedure to balance the relevant
covariates. One suitable indicator to assess the distance in the marginal distributions of the X-
variables is the standardised bias (SB) suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). For each covariate
X it is de¯ned as the di®erence of the sample means in the treated and (matched) comparison sub-
samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in both groups.
This is a common approach used in many evaluation studies, e.g. by Sianesi (2004). We estimate
the absolute bias between the respective participating and non-participating groups before and after
matching took place. To abbreviate the documentation, we calculated the means of the SB before
and after matching for the four main groups (Table 5) as an unweighted average of all variables
(mean standardised bias, MSB). The results for each variable can be found in table A.5 in appendix
A. The overall bias before matching lies between 10.9% for women in East Germany and 15.36%
for women in West Germany. A signi¯cant reduction can be achieved for all groups so that the bias
after matching is 2.5% (3.1%) for men (women) in West Germany and 1.8% (1.6%) for men (women)
in East Germany. Clearly, this is an enormous reduction and shows that the matching procedure is
able to balance the characteristics in the treatment and the matched comparison group.21
Additionally Sianesi (2004) suggests to re-estimate the propensity score on the matched sample (i.e.
on participants and matched non-participants) and compare the pseudo-R2's before and after match-
ing. After matching there should be no systematic di®erences in the distribution of the covariates
21 Looking at the results in more detail (table A.5) also shows that the matching procedure increases the bias for a few
variables. These are in particular categorial dummy variables. A good example is the variable `professional training' of
men in West Germany. The bias before matching for the category `technical school' has been 1.1% and increases after
matching to 2.8%. This increase has to be seen in relation to the high decrease in the other categories of this variable,
e.g. the bias for `industrial training' drops from 31.27% to 0.52%. Hence, it is of less importance. There are also two
non-categorial variables for which the matching increases the bias: the bias of `age' for women in East Germany is
increased from 1.4% to 2.5% and the bias for `rehabilitation attendant' for men in East Germany increases from 0.1%
to 0.8%. Since the bias after matching is still fairly low, this is of minor importance, too.
17Tab. 5: Some Quality Indicators
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Before Matching
Pseudo R
2 0.1389 0.1775 0.1225 0.1144
F-Test
1 2,406.8 1,679.4 2,951.3 4,323.3
Mean of standardised bias
2 14.62 16.08 12.01 10.83
After Matching
Pseudo-R
2 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.003
F-Test
1 38.0 23.4 35.3 39.2
Mean of standardised bias
2 2.51 3.20 1.78 1.60
1 Degrees of freedom for the F-Test: 41 for men and 40 for women.
2 Mean standardised bias has been calculated as an unweighted av-
erage of all covariates.
between both groups. Therefore, the pseudo-R2 after matching should be fairly low. As the results
from Table 5 show, this is true for our estimation. The results of the F-tests (with degrees of freedom
in brackets) point in the same direction, indicating a joint signi¯cance of all regressors before, but
not after matching.
Matching Quality for the Sub-Groups and the Regions Now that we have shown that
the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the covariates between treated and
comparison individuals in the main groups, we have to test this for the sub-groups and the regions,
too.
Table 6 contains the results for the eleven sub-groups. The ¯rst column in the table refers to the MSB
before matching and the second column shows the MSB after matching, when matching is done with
the estimated `overall' propensity score as shown in table A.4. This propensity score speci¯cation,
which we label P1, has been done separately for the four main groups. However, it is very clear
that the matching procedure based on the overall scores is not able to balance the covariates between
treated and matched non-treated individuals in the sub-groups. For example, the bias after matching
for men in West Germany reaches a level of 13.23% for rehabilitation attendants. Even though this
is a reduction compared to the MSB before matching, it is not acceptable. For women in West
Germany in this group the bias after matching is 18.69%. In East Germany the bias after matching
is not much lower, reaching levels of 13.11% for young men and 15.11% for young women. Even
though there are some sub-groups for which the bias is acceptable, the overall matching quality in
the sub-groups is not. Hence, alternative strategies are called for.
One way to do so is to re-de¯ne the propensity score estimation. Whereas the `overall' propensity
score estimation has only been done separately for men and women in West and East Germany, we
estimate in a second step `group-speci¯c' propensity scores. The basic idea behind that is to capture
the varying in°uence of the variables for certain sub-groups more accurately. Since we have eleven
sub-groups for both gender and regions, we are left with 44 propensity score estimations.22 Based
on these `group-speci¯c' estimations, labelled P2, we re-run the matching procedure and estimate
22 The results of these estimations are available on request by the authors.
18Tab. 6: Mean Standardised Bias in the Sub-Groups1,2,3
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Before
Match-
ing
After
Matching
with
Before
Match-
ing
After
Matching
with
Before
Match-
ing
After
Matching
with
Before
Match-
ing
After
Matching
with
Propensity Score Speci¯cation P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2
Sub-Groups
Age (in years)
<25 10.48 11.53 3.08 12.50 14.37 6.82 14.74 13.11 4.94 13.73 15.11 8.90
25-50 11.30 5.82 2.66 15.56 5.79 2.98 11.91 3.98 2.47 9.84 2.48 1.36
>50 17.82 12.48 5.83 20.48 12.70 6.62 16.79 9.48 2.55 14.98 6.56 1.55
Duration of unemployment
< 13 weeks 15.71 9.79 4.96 16.18 12.19 4.58 19.05 10.47 4.74 13.78 10.80 4.37
13-52 weeks 12.79 5.89 4.04 16.10 7.51 4.32 12.43 3.45 2.42 11.74 4.03 1.53
> 52 weeks 17.77 6.03 3.06 19.13 7.65 4.18 13.55 7.51 2.00 11.61 3.48 1.69
Without professional experience 14.02 9.50 5.69 15.93 11.49 6.36 12.10 10.43 4.18 12.17 5.51 3.35
Without professional training 14.31 3.99 3.29 16.79 4.68 4.25 11.17 5.68 2.48 11.04 4.42 2.72
With high degree 17.18 10.64 7.52 14.50 9.64 5.77 18.14 12.99 6.10 15.04 12.48 5.64
Rehabilitation attendant 18.13 13.23 8.45 23.96 18.69 16.31 12.88 10.05 4.38 15.87 10.71 5.87
With placement restrictions 19.29 8.92 4.61 26.99 11.37 4.99 15.35 8.22 3.91 18.37 6.84 3.11
Standardised before matching calculated as: 100 ¢ (X1 ¡ X0)=f
p
(V1(X) + V0(X))=2g.
Standardised after matching calculated as: 100 ¢ (X1M ¡ X0M)=f
p
(V1M(X) + V0M(X))=2g.
1 Mean standardised bias has been calculated as an unweighted average of all covariates.
2 P1 refers to the 'overall' propensity score estimation.
3 P2 refers to the 'group-speci¯c' propensity score estimation.
the MSB once again. It can be seen that the MSB is now clearly lower not only compared to the
situation before matching but also compared to the situation when matching on the `overall' score.
This result shows that using the `overall' score speci¯cation has not been ¯ne enough to balance the
relevant characteristics between participants and non-participants in the sub-groups. Hence, we will
use the `group-speci¯c' propensity scores for the further analysis in the sub-groups.
Finally, looking at the MSB in the di®erent regions (table A.6 in the appendix) shows rather good
results. The MSB after matching is between 2.3 and 6.9% in ¯ve out of seven regions. Two exceptions
are the clusters IV and V, where the MSB for men after matching is 8.2% (cluster IV) and 10.0%
(cluster V). For women, the bias after matching is even higher at 12.2% in cluster IV and 10.6%
in cluster V. However, since these are also the clusters with the lowest number of participants, we
refrain from a cluster-speci¯c estimation and use the overall speci¯cation of the propensity score for
further analysis in the clusters.
5 Empirical Results
An important decision which has to be made in every evaluation is when to measure the programme
e®ects. The empirical analysis should ensure that participants and non-participants are compared
in the same economic environment and the same lifecycle position. The literature is dominated
by two approaches, either comparing individuals from begin or after the end of programmes. The
latter approach is problematic for two reasons. First, since it implies comparison of participants and
19non-participants in the month(s) after programmes end, very di®erent economic situations maybe
compared if exits are spread over a longer time period. Second, this approach entails an endogeneity
problem of programme exits (Ger¯n and Lechner, 2002). A second approach which is predominant
in the recent literature (see e.g. Sianesi (2004) or Ger¯n and Lechner (2002)) and which is also used
here, measures the e®ects from begin of the programmes. By doing so, the policy-relevant question
if the placement o±cer should place an unemployed individual in February 2000 in a JCS or not,
can be answered. What should be kept in mind is the possible occurrence of locking-in e®ects for
the group of participants. van Ours (2004) notes that the net e®ect of a programme consists of two
opposite e®ects: First, the employment probability of the participants is expected to rise due to
positive aspects of the programme. Second, since participants who are involved in the programmes
do not have the same time to look for new jobs as non-participants, a reduced search intensity during
programmes is expected. Since it is not possible to disentangle both e®ects, locking-in e®ects should
be seen as a constituent part of the overall programme e®ect (Sianesi, 2001). When interpreting the
results the di®erent impacts of the two underlying e®ects have to be considered. As to the fall in the
search intensity, we should expect an initial negative locking-in e®ect from any kind of participation
in a programme. To assess the possible magnitude of this initial e®ect it is helpful to look at the
programme exit rates in each group.23 Most of the participants leave the programmes after one year.
In March 2001, around 80% (74%) of the male (female) participants in West Germany have left
the programmes. The corresponding numbers are approximately 91% for men and 92% for women
in East Germany.24 Since we observe the outcome of the individuals until almost three years after
programmes start, successful programmes should overcompensate for this initial fall.
Results for the Main Groups The results from the begin (February 2000) to the end (December
2002) of our observation period for the main and the sub-groups are depicted in ¯gures 1 to 4. Figure
1 contains the results for men in West Germany. The solid line in the graphs describes the monthly
employment e®ect, i.e. the di®erence in the employment rates between participants and matched non-
participants. The graphs for the main group are captioned `total' in the ¯gures. All of the graphs
have one thing in common, namely a large drop in the e®ects for the ¯rst months after programme
start. This can be interpreted as the expected locking-in e®ect, which is more pronounced for men
(¯gure 1) and women (¯gure 2) in West Germany than for men (¯gure 3) and women (¯gure 4)
in East Germany. To allow a more accurate discussion, we have also put together the results for
six selected months in tables A.7 for West Germany and A.8 for East Germany in the appendix.
Five months after programmes have started (in July 2000), the e®ects for men in West Germany lie
around -21.1%. That means that the average employment rate of participating men is about 21%
lower in comparison to matched non-participants. Clearly, this strong reduction is expected as nearly
23 Tables with the cumulated exit rates for the main and the sub-groups are available on request by the authors.
24 At ¯rst sight, this is at odds with our ¯ndings in the descriptive analysis, that the programme duration is on average
shorter in West Germany. However, the results get clear when looking at the exit rates in the ¯rst month, where much
more participants leave the programmes in West Germany. Additionally, there is quite a signi¯cant variation in the exit
rates for the sub-groups, e.g. only 73% of the male participants who are older than 50 years have left the programme
in March 2001. This variation has to be taken into account when interpreting the results.
20all participants are still in the programmes, whereas the non-participants have the chance to search,
apply for and ¯nd a new job. For the interpretation one has to bear in mind, that although JCS are
some kind of employment, they are classi¯ed as failures when assessing the re-integration success into
regular (unsubsidised) employment. For women in West Germany the result is very similar in that
month and amounts to around -20.4%. The situation in East Germany is somewhat di®erent. The
e®ects are here -14.0% for men and -9.4% for women. Compared to the results for West Germany,
this re°ects the worse labour market situation with fewer employment opportunities. Being locked
into the programme does not have as much in°uence, since the chances of non-participants to ¯nd a
new job are lower anyway.
The development of the e®ects is quite di®erent for both regions, too. Whereas in West Germany a
relatively steep increase in the employment e®ects can be found, the development in East Germany is
much smoother. For example, in July 2001 the employment e®ect has risen to -12.5% for men and -
11.9% for women in West Germany. Hence, the negative e®ects are nearly halved. In East Germany,
however, the e®ects lie around -10.9% for men and -7.5% for women. Looking at the last month
of our observation period (December 2002), we do not ¯nd a signi¯cant programme e®ect for men
in West Germany. That is, the employment chances of participants and matched non-participants
do not di®er. However, for women in West Germany we ¯nd a signi¯cant positive e®ect of 4.6%,
which means that participating women have bene¯ted from the programme in terms of employment
chances. However, this positive result has to be treated with caution since women in West Germany
have been the smallest group, we have lost a considerable share of participants due to the common
support requirement and the estimates imply a con¯dence interval which is close to zero.
For East Germany on the other hand, we ¯nd negative employment e®ects of -2.9% for men and -1.4%
for women. This shows that the overall e®ect of JCS for the participating individuals is dissatisfying.
Only for one of the groups, namely women in West Germany, we ¯nd a positive employment e®ect
nearly three years after programmes have started, whereas for the other three main groups the e®ects
are negative or insigni¯cant. It seems that the pronounced initial negative (locking-in) e®ect cannot
be overcome during our observation period. Judging by these numbers, JCS have to be rated as
unsuccessful regarding their goal to re-integrate individuals into regular (unsubsidised) employment.
Results for the Selected Sub-Groups Even though JCS do not work for the participants as
a whole, they may work for sub-groups. For instance, one could assume that they are especially
e®ective for the explicit target groups of JCS, like long-term unemployed persons or persons without
work experience. Figures 1 to 4 and tables A.7 and A.8 contain the results for our selected sub-
groups. To abbreviate the discussion, we concentrate on two main points. First, we will examine the
occurrence of locking-in e®ects and second, we will discuss the results at the end of the observation
period (December 2002).
Considering locking-in e®ects is explicitly of interest, since it can be expected that these e®ects di®er
for the sub-groups. Good examples are provided by the groups de¯ned by age and unemployment
duration. Older unemployed persons have in general fewer labour market opportunities than middle-
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25aged or younger persons. Due to the worse `outside options' of the non-participants, we expect to ¯nd
weaker locking-in e®ects for older participants and stronger e®ects for the other groups (young and
middle-aged persons). The ¯gures support these expectations empirically, independently of gender of
region. With regard to the previous unemployment duration, it can be assumed that re-integration
into the labour market is generally easier for persons with only a short duration of unemployment
(`negative duration dependence'). Therefore, short-term unemployed non-participants are expected
to have a higher probability of receiving a job o®er and hence the locking-in e®ects are larger. The
¯ndings support this expectation.
For the other sub-groups the graphs present a similar picture. We ¯nd the initial fall of the em-
ployment e®ects in the ¯rst months after programmes have started and rising tendencies after the
majority of participants has left the programmes. The reasons have been discussed already.
The second point we want to discuss are the e®ects for these sub-groups at the end of our observation
period (December 2002). For most of the groups we do not ¯nd signi¯cant programme e®ects at this
point in time, i.e. the employment rates of participants and matched non-participants do not di®er
nearly three years after programmes have started. That implies that programmes have neither
improved nor worsened the employment chances of participating individuals. However, for some of
the groups we ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences in the employment rates. Long-term unemployed (more
than 52 weeks) men (5.0%) and women (11.3%) in West Germany bene¯t from participation. These
results indicate that JCS could improve the employment chances of this target group. Additionally,
high quali¯ed men in West Germany bene¯t from participation (12.5%), whereas for low quali¯ed
persons and individuals without work experience no signi¯cant e®ects can be established. This is
intuitively not understandable, since programmes should be designed for persons who are most in
need of assistance. Another group who bene¯ts from participation are older women in West Germany,
whose employment rate is 12.7% higher than for matched non-participants. This is an encouraging
result, because older unemployed persons in particular have only poor opportunities to return to the
¯rst labour market. Although for most groups we do not ¯nd any enhancement of the employment
chances after participation, the results indicate a tendency that programmes are actually only useful
for the most-disadvantaged in terms of unemployment duration and age.
Considering the results for the sub-groups in East Germany reveals a somewhat di®erent picture.
Focussing on the male groups, we only ¯nd a signi¯cant negative e®ect (-10.1%) for participants with a
short unemployment duration before programme. What has to be kept in mind, is the relatively high
share of individuals in this group which we have lost due to the common support restriction. Hence,
we are reluctant to overemphasise the relevance of this e®ect. For all other groups no signi¯cant
di®erences in the employment rates can be established. For women in East Germany the results
are disappointing as well. Middle-aged (-2.2%) as well as short-term unemployed women (-7.4%)
su®er from participation. Another group with clearly negative programme e®ects in December 2002
are high quali¯ed women (-9.8%). However, there is also one group (long-term unemployed women)
for whom we ¯nd a small (2.5%) positive programme e®ect. For the other groups no signi¯cant
di®erences can be established. Thus, the above stated hypothesis that programmes are actually only
26Tab. 7: Employment E®ects in the Regional Clusters
Jul 00 Dec 00 Jul 01 Dec 01 Jul 02 Dec 02
E®ect S.E. E®ect S.E. E®ect S.E. E®ect S.E. E®ect S.E. E®ect S.E.
Men
Cluster Ia -0.1484 0.0118 -0.1095 0.0113 -0.0980 0.0158 -0.0663 0.0148 -0.0346 0.0186 -0.0014 0.0187
Cluster Ib -0.1477 0.0074 -0.1245 0.0080 -0.1080 0.0077 -0.0656 0.0086 -0.0518 0.0088 -0.0298 0.0106
Cluster Ic -0.1957 0.0220 -0.1615 0.0245 -0.1677 0.0255 -0.1025 0.0236 -0.0652 0.0293 -0.0124 0.0298
Cluster II -0.1446 0.0126 -0.1557 0.0141 -0.0723 0.0169 -0.0623 0.0176 -0.0145 0.0172 -0.0033 0.0175
Cluster III -0.2340 0.0137 -0.1711 0.0192 -0.1220 0.0231 -0.0818 0.0210 -0.0377 0.0233 -0.0063 0.0239
Cluster IV -0.1646 0.0381 -0.0732 0.0405 -0.0732 0.0552 -0.0427 0.0486 0.0000 0.0529 0.0183 0.0472
Cluster V -0.3311 0.0312 -0.2669 0.0315 -0.2264 0.0339 -0.1284 0.0403 -0.0912 0.0363 -0.0507 0.0331
Women
Cluster Ia -0.0815 0.0075 -0.0783 0.0091 -0.0618 0.0114 -0.0511 0.0105 -0.0404 0.0157 -0.0189 0.0149
Cluster Ib -0.0990 0.0059 -0.0940 0.0046 -0.0788 0.0054 -0.0537 0.0058 -0.0456 0.0072 -0.0155 0.0067
Cluster Ic -0.1043 0.0141 -0.1329 0.0171 -0.0818 0.0212 -0.0573 0.0214 -0.0593 0.0200 -0.0450 0.0224
Cluster II -0.1647 0.0214 -0.1909 0.0185 -0.1265 0.0268 -0.1146 0.0293 -0.0358 0.0346 -0.0191 0.0292
Cluster III -0.1935 0.0212 -0.2016 0.0231 -0.1210 0.0272 -0.0565 0.0299 0.0215 0.0301 0.0618 0.0326
Cluster IV -0.1972 0.0639 -0.1972 0.0627 -0.0423 0.0817 -0.0845 0.0875 0.1127 0.0943 0.1268 0.0882
Cluster V -0.3077 0.0376 -0.2582 0.0387 -0.1648 0.0459 -0.0769 0.0505 -0.0055 0.0478 0.0000 0.0470
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance on a 1% level, italic letters refer to the 5% level, standard errors are bootstrapped with 50
replications.
Results refer to NN matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02.
likely to work for the legally de¯ned target groups, can only be supported for long-term unemployed
women.
Results for the Regional Clusters We use the FEA clusters to analyse possible e®ect hetero-
geneity that may occur due to di®erences in the regional labour market environment. Two hypotheses
may be formulated: First, it may be the case that JCS work in situations with high labour market
imbalances. Second, it may also be stated that JCS work better in prospering regions (when concen-
trating more explicitly on speci¯c target groups). To check these hypotheses, we estimate the e®ects
for the seven clusters. Table 7 contains the employment e®ects for men and women in these clusters
in six selected months. To abbreviate the discussion, we concentrate on the locking-in e®ect (July
2000) and the e®ects at the end of our observation period (December 2002). Starting with men in
East Germany, it can be seen that the highest locking-in e®ect is measured in districts of cluster
Ic (-19.6%), which have the relatively best labour market conditions. For women a similar picture
emerges, even though less pronounced (-10.4% in Ic). The same story extends to West Germany,
where men (women) in districts of cluster V have an average employment e®ect of -33.1% (-30.7%) in
July 2000. One might speculate that this is caused by the better `outside options' of non-participants
in these clusters. Thus, participants in clusters with a better labour market environment (Ic and V)
experience lower locking-in e®ects.
Turning to the results in December 2002 does not allow to extend these ¯ndings. Most of the results
are insigni¯cant and we do not ¯nd that programme participants in clusters with better labour
market situations are worse o®. In total, we can establish signi¯cant di®erences in the employment
levels of participants and matched non-participants for only three groups. The ¯rst group are men
27in districts of cluster Ib, the `typical' East German labour o±ce. There we ¯nd a negative e®ect
of -3.0%. For women in cluster Ib (-1.6%) and Ic (-4.5%) the e®ects are signi¯cantly negative, too.
It should be noted that the results do not diverge much from the overall results in West and East
Germany. Based on these ¯ndings, neither of the two stated hypotheses can be con¯rmed.
Sensitivity of the Results to Unobserved Heterogeneity The estimation of treatment e®ects
with matching estimators is based on the CIA. Hence, if both groups di®er on unobserved variables
which simultaneously a®ect assignment into treatment and the outcome variable, there may be
a `hidden bias'. It should be clear that matching estimators are not robust against this `hidden
bias'. Since it is impossible to estimate the magnitude of selection bias with non-experimental data,
we address this problem with the bounding approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002). The basic
question to be answered is, if inference about programme e®ects may be altered by unobserved
factors. In other words, we want to determine how strongly an unmeasured variable must in°uence
the selection process in order to undermine the implications of matching analysis. Recent applications
of this approach can be found in Aakvik (2001), DiPrete and Gangl (2004) and Hujer, Caliendo, and
Thomsen (2004).
We outline this approach brie°y, an extensive discussion can be found in Rosenbaum (2002). The
participation probability for individual i with observed characteristics xi can be written as P(xi) =
P(Di = 1 j xi) = F(¯xi + °ui), where ui is the unobserved variable and ° is the e®ect of ui on
the participation decision. Clearly, if there is no hidden bias, ° will be zero and the participation
probability will solely be determined by xi. However, if hidden bias exists, two individuals with the
same observed covariates x have di®ering chances of receiving treatment. Following Aakvik (2001), we
assume for the sake of simplicity that the unobserved covariate is a dummy variable with ui 2 f0;1g.
A good example is the case, where motivation of the individuals is an important determinant of
participation and the outcome variable, and a person is either motivated (u = 1) or not (u = 0).
Rosenbaum (2002) derives the following bounds on the log-odds ratio that either of the two matched
individuals will receive treatment:
1
e° ·
P(xi)(1 ¡ P(xj))
P(xj)(1 ¡ P(xi))
· e°: (3)
Matched individuals have the same probability of participating only if e° = 1. Else, if for example
e° = 2, individuals who appear to be similar (in terms of x) may di®er in their odds of receiving the
treatment by as much as a factor of 2. In this sense, e° is a measure of the degree of departure from
an estimation that is free of hidden bias (Rosenbaum, 2002). The basic idea now is to increase the
in°uence of e° and see if inference from the test statistic is changed. Aakvik (2001) suggests to use
the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistic, which compares the successful number of persons in
the treatment group against the same expected number, given the treatment e®ect is zero.
Table A.9 in appendix A contains the results of the sensitivity analysis for two selected months (July
and December 2002) of the examined sub-groups. First of all, the table contains the e®ects and the
results of the Mantel and Haensel (1959) test-statistic for the situation free of hidden bias (e° = 1). A
28Â2-value below 3:84 indicates that the treatment e®ect is insigni¯cant. Clearly, a sensitivity analysis
for insigni¯cant e®ects is not meaningful and hence will be omitted. For the signi¯cant e®ects, we
gradually increase the level of e° until the inference about the treatment e®ect is changed. In other
words, we are assessing the strength unmeasured in°uences would require in order to change inference
about the treatment e®ect.
The interpretation is straightforward: Taking the e®ect for men in West Germany in July 2002 as an
example, we see that the e®ect is ¡3:06% and signi¯cant. The critical value of e° is between 1.50 and
1.55. A critical value of 1.50 suggests that individuals with the same X-vector di®er in their odds of
participation by a factor of 1.50, or 50%. It is important to note that these are worst-case scenarios.
Hence, a critical value of e° = 1:50 does not mean that unobserved heterogeneity exists and that
there is no e®ect of treatment on the outcome variable. This result only states that the con¯dence
interval for the e®ect would include zero if an unobserved variable caused the odds ratio of treatment
assignment to di®er between treatment and comparison groups by 1:50. Additionally, this variable's
e®ect on the outcome would have to be so strong that it almost perfectly determines the outcome
in each pair of matched cases in the data. However, even if there is unobserved heterogeneity to a
degree of e° = 1:50 in the group of West German men, inference about the treatment e®ect would
not be changed.
The results are ambivalent and di®er between West and East Germany. In West Germany most
of the e®ects for men and women in the sub-groups are insigni¯cant. But for those groups where
the e®ects are signi¯cant, even a large in°uence of unobserved heterogeneity does not have much
in°uence on the inference about treatment e®ects. The lowest critical value of e° can be found for
men without professional training in July 2002 (1.40-1.45) and the largest critical values of 1.75-1.80
can be found for high-quali¯ed men (in July and December 2002) as well as for long-term unemployed
women in July 2002 and high quali¯ed women in December 2002. Therefore, we can conclude for
West Germany that even large amounts of unobserved heterogeneity would not alter the inference
about the estimated e®ects.
In contrast to that the results in East Germany are not so clear-cut. We ¯nd that for some of the sub-
groups, like older or short-term unemployed men as well as for high quali¯ed women and for women
with placement restrictions, inference would change in July 2002 even with small amounts of hidden
bias. The critical value of e° is somewhere below 1:05, which implies that even small magnitudes of
`hidden bias' would alter the inference. Consequently, interpretation for these sub-populations hinges
on this restriction. For the results of the main groups, i.e. men and women, the critical value of e°
in December 2002 is somewhere between 1.25 and 1.30. So these e®ects can be viewed as relatively
robust to unobserved heterogeneity.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is the evaluation of the re-integration e®ects of JCS into regular (unsubsidised)
employment for the participating individuals in Germany. JCS have been the second most important
29ALMP programme in recent years and provide subsidised jobs for unemployed workers who cannot
be integrated into regular employment and do not ful¯ll the requirements for other programmes. Our
analysis is based on a dataset from administrative sources of the FEA which contains information
of all participants (11,151), who started a JCS in February 2000. The comparison group consists
of job-seekers (219,622) who were eligible for participation in January 2000 but did not participate.
Special attention is given to the possible occurrence of individual, i.e. group-speci¯c, and regional
e®ect heterogeneity. That is we estimate the e®ects separately for men and women in West and East
Germany (`main groups') as well as for eleven `sub-groups' and within seven regional clusters.
Due to the non-experimental data used in this analysis the problem of selection bias has to be ad-
dressed. Given the very informative dataset, we apply a matching estimator based on the conditional
independence assumption. Since the large number of relevant covariates makes exact matching unfea-
sible, we use propensity score matching (PSM) for the analysis. When implementing PSM estimators,
several decisions have to be made. The estimation of the propensity score is a ¯rst and crucial issue
and hence we test several alternative speci¯cations. Furthermore, we also test the sensitivity of the
e®ects with respect to di®erent matching algorithms. It becomes apparent that the results are not
sensitive to the algorithm choice. The major goal of PSM is to balance the distribution of covari-
ates across the groups of participants and non-participants. A suitable measure to test this is the
standardised bias. It turns out that our `overall' propensity score, which we estimate for the `main
groups', is able to balance the distribution in the `main groups' very well. However, it is not able to
balance the distribution accurately in the sub-groups. Thus, we estimate `group-speci¯c' propensity
scores and use these for the analysis in the sub-groups.
The e®ects are estimated from begin of the programmes in February 2000 until December 2002. Since
JCS are usually supported for twelve months, we ¯nd large locking-in e®ects for all of the groups.
The locking-in e®ects are more pronounced in West Germany and less substantial in East Germany,
which may be caused by the better employment opportunities for non-participants in the West.
Regarding the e®ects for the main groups at the end of the observation period, we ¯nd a signi¯cant
positive e®ect only for women in West Germany (4.6%), whereas the e®ect for men in West Germany
is insigni¯cant. For men (-2.9%) and women (-1.4%) in East Germany the e®ects are signi¯cantly
negative. Interpretation of the results may be hampered by two issues. First, the number of treated
individuals lost due to the common support requirement and second, the matching quality. As
already said, the matching quality is very good for the `main groups' even though for women in
West Germany the matching quality was less satisfying. This group was also the one for whom
we lost the highest number of individuals in comparison to the other groups due to the common
support requirement, advising some caution when interpreting the e®ects. Hence, except for women
in West Germany, it seems that the initial negative locking-in e®ect cannot be overcome during the
observation period.
For most of the sub-groups we do not ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects at all. However, some exceptions have
to be noted. Long-term unemployed men (5.0%) and women (12.7%) as well as high quali¯ed men
(12.5%) and older women (12.7%) in West Germany bene¯t from participation. Common support
30and matching quality are not an issue for the long-term unemployed, but they de¯nitely are for the
latter two groups, since we lose nearly 7% of older women and over 14% of high quali¯ed men due to
failing common support. Looking additionally at the relatively high remaining bias after matching
for these two groups makes an interpretation of their results questionable.
The only sub-group with a positive e®ect in East Germany are long-term unemployed women (2.5%).
In East Germany we ¯nd signi¯cant negative e®ects for short-term unemployed men (-10.1%) and
women (-7.4%) as well as for women between 25 and 50 years (-2.2%) and for high quali¯ed women
(-9.8%). Matching quality is satisfying for all of these ¯ve sub-groups. However, for the short-term
unemployed persons and women with high degree we lose substantial amounts of individuals due to
failure of the common support, indicating that it is problematic to ¯nd short-term unemployed who
did not participate and have similar characteristics.
The positive ¯ndings for the long-term unemployed persons may indicate that JCS do work for this
problem group of the labour market. However, this result cannot be extended to other problem
groups, like individuals with placement restrictions, individuals without work experience or low
quali¯ed persons. Even though we would have expected positive e®ects for these problem groups of
the labour market, we did not ¯nd any. Our regional analysis did not support any of the hypotheses
that the programmes work better either in regions with a depressed or prospering labour market
situation. The results for the clusters did not diverge much from the overall result in West and East
Germany. To some extent the e®ects re°ect the di®erent purpose of JCS in both parts. Whereas
they are used as a relief of the labour market in East Germany they are more tightly addressed to
problem groups in the West.
The overall picture is rather disappointing since most of the e®ects are insigni¯cant or negative.
Participation in programmes does not help individuals to re-integrate into regular (unsubsidised)
employment. One notable exception are long-term unemployed men and women in West Germany as
well as long-term unemployed women in East Germany. The long-term unemployed are usually one of
the most problematic groups on the labour market and re-integrating them into regular employment
is extremely di±cult. Hence, the positive result for them is promising and shows that JCS might work
for this target group and might be an alternative for hard-to-place individuals. Clearly, one policy
implication is to address programmes to this problem group more tightly, which is at the moment,
especially in East Germany, not the case. Limiting access to these programmes and tailoring them
more for the ones who need them most might be a way to improve their overall e±ciency and o®ering
a `last chance' for hard-to-place individuals.
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34A Tables and Figures
Tab. A.1: Selected Descriptives for the Main Groups
West East1
Men Women Men Women
Variable Part.
Non-
Part. Part.
Non-
Part. Part.
Non-
Part. Part.
Non-
Part.
Means
Programme duration 278.04 304.88 318.78 333.27
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 37.21 43.22 37.82 43.33 44.51 41.73 43.86 44.01
Married 0.35 0.52 0.40 0.63 0.54 0.48 0.68 0.64
Number of children 0.43 0.41 0.58 0.58 0.40 0.36 0.79 0.67
Duration last employment 19.31 72.08 25.00 64.12 24.12 55.51 31.10 63.44
Number of placement propositions 7.70 3.60 6.87 2.99 6.06 3.01 5.42 2.77
Last contact to job center 2.48 2.54 2.53 2.40 2.54 2.79 2.59 2.78
Rehabilitation attendant 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.05
Placement restrictions 0.17 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.12
Frequencies in %
Health restrictions
No health restrictions 74.30 68.23 78.23 73.29 76.57 74.99 85.08 79.55
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 2.29 1.26 2.85 0.79 0.55 0.47 0.44 0.28
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 6.17 5.87 5.04 3.93 3.49 2.44 1.95 1.63
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.47 0.37 0.76 0.26 1.27 0.65 0.70 0.45
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 2.76 4.74 1.71 3.52 1.47 1.74 0.71 1.16
Other health restrictions 14.02 19.54 11.41 18.20 16.66 19.71 11.12 16.94
Quali¯cation Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE3 26.03 15.48 7.98 10.64 8.72 6.01 3.54 4.91
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 36.59 33.64 37.26 39.30 19.90 17.09 18.73 20.94
Industrial training 29.35 44.25 32.79 41.62 60.23 68.57 62.74 66.03
Full-time vocational school 0.75 1.05 2.57 2.22 0.65 0.56 1.99 1.14
Technical school 2.06 2.22 5.51 2.82 5.51 3.63 9.22 4.86
Polytechnic 1.82 1.25 5.42 0.97 1.20 1.09 1.05 0.49
College, university 3.41 2.12 8.46 2.44 3.80 3.05 2.74 1.63
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, ¯shery 8.69 3.72 2.00 1.75 6.77 5.35 7.27 5.18
Mining, mineral extraction 0.23 0.62 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.27 0.00 0.05
Manufacturing 52.10 47.71 14.64 23.53 52.43 52.82 18.67 19.73
Technical professions 2.85 5.34 1.90 2.08 6.91 5.97 5.20 3.18
Service professions 33.64 40.71 79.56 71.16 32.97 32.67 68.60 70.34
Other professions 2.48 0.12 1.90 0.06 0.79 0.04 0.26 0.02
Professional rank
Unskilled Worker 31.96 24.25 13.78 17.05 30.47 21.51 24.97 20.55
Skilled Worker 7.10 15.29 3.71 5.71 20.01 29.40 14.18 15.96
White-collar worker, simple occupations 5.05 7.24 18.54 18.45 4.92 4.20 10.55 9.13
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 3.69 4.71 9.41 4.35 1.68 2.01 1.83 1.85
Other 52.20 48.52 54.56 54.45 42.92 42.87 48.48 52.50
Quali¯cation (with work experience) 87.24 92.56 84.89 92.56 89.98 89.16 90.11 89.62
Career Variables
Duration of unemployment
<13 26.07 27.66 22.53 22.09 19.77 33.96 11.42 16.27
13-52 34.77 31.54 38.31 35.75 42.68 35.29 39.13 34.84
>52 39.16 40.79 39.16 42.16 37.55 30.75 49.45 48.89
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme 71.45 89.95 66.83 91.14 52.84 82.92 42.72 72.15
Further education compl., cont. education 9.77 6.97 12.36 7.38 14.16 8.74 23.54 16.65
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 1.07 0.48 0.57 0.25 5.57 2.90 4.77 3.07
Job-preparative measure 0.05 0.05 0.57 0.04 0.21 0.14 0.08 0.12
Job creation scheme 16.92 1.56 18.54 0.79 26.44 4.56 28.58 7.62
Rehabilitation measure 0.75 0.98 1.14 0.41 0.79 0.74 0.32 0.39
1 DoR = degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certi¯cate for secondary education
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37Tab. A.4: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Variable Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E.
Constant -1.1739 0.2731 -3.1254 0.4533 -5.7880 0.3659 -8.0021 0.3944
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -0.0599 0.0145 -0.0067 0.0235 0.0901 0.0141 0.1702 0.0136
Age2 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0019 0.0002
Married -0.1676 0.0612 -0.4483 0.0761 0.2683 0.0506 0.1145 0.0344
Number of children 0.0653 0.0281 -0.0183 0.0439 -0.0335 0.0266 -0.0238 0.0184
German 0.4402 0.0683 0.2825 0.1211 0.6284 0.1966 0.7082 0.2432
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.9160 0.1826 1.3404 0.2578 0.5491 0.2758 1.1375 0.2442
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.8052 0.1267 0.6433 0.1978 0.4991 0.1270 0.6032 0.1242
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.1190 0.3658 1.9871 0.4246 0.5691 0.1925 0.7999 0.1954
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.2757 0.1570 0.0651 0.2685 -0.0708 0.1721 -0.0725 0.1826
Other health restrictions -0.0472 0.0892 -0.0751 0.1390 -0.1918 0.0716 -0.1422 0.0608
Quali¯cation Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE3 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.3364 0.0622 0.2294 0.1334 0.1015 0.0823 0.3428 0.0865
Industrial training -0.6738 0.0692 -0.0808 0.1399 -0.1777 0.0748 0.3315 0.0820
Full-time vocational school -0.7639 0.2685 -0.0734 0.2432 -0.3223 0.2594 0.8588 0.1384
Technical school -0.0987 0.1756 0.7183 0.1927 0.2227 0.1231 1.0166 0.0977
Polytechnic 0.3534 0.2009 1.4983 0.2144 -0.0135 0.2058 1.0388 0.1794
College, university 0.2399 0.1577 1.0221 0.1869 0.0810 0.1354 0.9004 0.1272
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, ¯shery 0.2222 0.0927 0.2628 0.2501 0.0092 0.0828 0.2370 0.0670
Mining, mineral extraction -0.5605 0.4657 -0.7494 0.5154
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.5810 0.1544 -0.1609 0.2605 -0.1954 0.0999 0.2149 0.0819
Service professions -0.3077 0.0544 0.3167 0.0995 -0.1739 0.0478 0.0127 0.0406
Other professions 0.1023 0.1533 0.3933 0.2628 -1.1891 0.2170 -1.2092 0.2860
Professional rank
Unskilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Skilled worker -0.5499 0.0982 -0.1637 0.1944 -0.1811 0.0597 0.0657 0.0525
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.0163 0.1152 0.1490 0.1256 0.1809 0.1067 0.2197 0.0605
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.0877 0.1536 0.5131 0.1624 -0.2838 0.1662 -0.0404 0.1215
Other -0.0112 0.0563 0.1512 0.1054 0.0345 0.0528 0.1004 0.0437
Quali¯cation (with work experience) -0.3397 0.0745 -0.3139 0.1017 -0.2279 0.0695 -0.1175 0.0527
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0046 0.0005 -0.0033 0.0007 -0.0038 0.0004 -0.0028 0.0003
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks 0.2055 0.0616 0.0698 0.0889 0.4673 0.0561 0.2509 0.0511
More than 52 weeks 0.3087 0.0678 0.0888 0.0974 0.4498 0.0599 0.1694 0.0509
Number of placement propositions 0.0494 0.0028 0.0530 0.0042 0.0610 0.0030 0.0919 0.0031
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0013 0.0125 0.0520 0.0177 -0.1204 0.0114 -0.0644 0.0085
Rehabilitation attendant -0.1533 0.1185 0.0696 0.2039 0.2958 0.0939 0.1535 0.1024
Placement restrictions -0.3396 0.0989 -0.2654 0.1546 -0.3164 0.0870 -0.3000 0.0825
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.2292 0.0801 0.5301 0.1043 0.4830 0.0628 0.5263 0.0422
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.6479 0.2286 0.4613 0.4466 0.6545 0.0893 0.5634 0.0746
Job-preparative measure -0.4764 1.0285 2.6387 0.5245 1.1431 0.4289 0.3364 0.5250
Job creation scheme 2.1463 0.0777 3.0671 0.1141 1.7272 0.0546 1.5382 0.0418
Rehabilitation measure -0.0929 0.2706 0.9368 0.3406 0.4232 0.2273 0.3780 0.2720
Regional Context Variables4
Cluster Ia -0.1040 0.1291 0.1421 0.1238
Cluster Ib -0.3077 0.1248 -0.0242 0.1210
Cluster Ic -0.2838 0.1361 -0.1841 0.1292
Cluster II -0.2225 0.0730 -0.5666 0.0960 Ref. Ref.
Cluster III -0.1841 0.0722 -0.4601 0.0917
Cluster IV -0.0080 0.1002 -0.4530 0.1423
Cluster V Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR = degree of restriction.
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certi¯cate for secondary education
4 Cluster according to the classi¯cation as described in table B.1.
38Tab. A.5: Standardised Bias Main Groups - Before and After Matching
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 48.64 4.22 47.62 5.64 22.84 1.09 1.37 2.49
Married 34.17 6.28 48.47 8.16 11.29 0.89 6.98 0.47
Number of children 2.25 1.11 0.75 0.58 5.32 1.32 12.20 1.26
German 8.19 1.30 13.97 3.27 6.98 1.84 6.29 0.69
Health restrictions
No health restrictions 13.44 5.27 11.55 5.31 3.69 0.81 14.55 3.24
Acc. DoR1 , 80% and over 7.83 0.33 15.47 1.96 1.14 0.90 2.70 0.89
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 1.25 1.82 5.34 2.59 6.16 0.19 2.35 1.27
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.59 3.97 6.97 4.10 6.32 0.90 3.29 1.81
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 10.46 3.62 11.36 4.99 2.14 1.16 4.59 0.98
Other health restrictions 14.80 2.89 19.22 1.26 7.92 0.73 16.81 4.76
Quali¯cation Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE3 26.22 4.05 9.12 2.59 10.39 1.79 6.82 1.65
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 6.19 1.57 4.18 5.01 7.25 0.77 5.55 3.22
Industrial training 31.27 0.52 18.34 4.99 17.50 0.70 6.87 1.64
Full-time vocational school 3.20 1.13 2.26 2.45 1.15 3.79 6.81 0.84
Technical school 1.10 2.77 13.50 0.00 9.02 1.19 17.06 2.10
Polytechnic 4.68 1.09 25.51 2.48 1.01 0.96 6.48 1.52
College, university 7.86 1.06 26.76 2.88 4.11 2.02 7.60 0.84
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, ¯shery 20.69 1.52 1.79 0.00 5.98 0.00 8.63 1.32
Mining, mineral extraction 5.95 2.17 0.00 3.04 3.51 0.00
Manufacturing 8.80 0.09 22.79 5.31 0.78 0.07 2.72 0.66
Technical professions 12.59 0.00 1.27 4.83 3.80 1.73 10.10 0.09
Service professions 14.66 1.30 19.54 5.92 0.63 0.87 3.86 0.00
Other professions 3.97 1.48 3.52 0.75 15.85 0.38 13.43 1.79
Professional rank
Unskilled worker 17.22 2.52 9.01 2.04 20.54 1.92 10.55 1.14
Skilled worker 26.18 6.56 9.45 3.09 21.91 6.40 4.98 3.54
White-collar worker, simple occupations 9.13 1.06 0.20 4.66 3.46 0.80 4.75 3.04
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 5.06 3.14 20.09 4.58 2.52 1.65 0.21 1.21
Other 7.36 1.51 0.22 3.89 0.10 4.00 8.05 3.58
Quali¯cation (with work experience) 17.71 0.70 24.41 3.89 2.68 1.69 1.65 0.13
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) 57.08 6.26 51.99 9.34 36.23 0.77 37.47 1.44
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks 3.58 2.92 1.07 1.45 32.44 8.44 14.09 1.45
Between 13 and 52 weeks 6.85 3.83 5.31 2.93 15.20 2.42 8.89 0.08
More than 52 weeks 3.34 1.16 6.12 4.21 14.38 4.22 1.13 0.84
Number of placement propositions 59.16 4.74 60.13 0.50 57.97 1.79 64.89 0.04
Last contact to job center (weeks) 2.55 0.38 6.04 2.77 12.16 1.35 9.21 0.19
Rehabilitation attendant 4.65 0.43 5.74 2.17 0.11 0.78 7.83 2.49
Placement restrictions 12.85 4.28 9.46 6.48 7.56 1.49 15.11 2.32
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme 48.23 2.85 62.49 2.96 68.03 0.62 62.35 0.48
Further education compl., cont. education 10.11 5.34 16.75 2.45 17.08 4.98 17.26 4.67
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 6.73 3.36 5.04 1.36 13.31 3.74 8.75 0.56
Job-preparative measure 0.15 0.00 9.67 2.42 1.52 0.73 1.37 0.00
Job creation scheme 54.99 9.35 62.93 2.47 63.39 5.84 56.58 3.69
Rehabilitation measure 2.55 0.00 8.39 1.78 0.56 1.49 1.27 0.00
Regional Context Variables4
Cluster Ia 3.94 0.48 3.98 2.39
Cluster Ib 4.83 0.21 1.84 2.56
Cluster Ic 1.78 0.76 1.29 1.20
Cluster II 2.13 2.31 3.41 1.51 0.71 0.88 3.24 1.31
Cluster III 2.21 0.78 2.11 0.21
Cluster IV 0.67 2.06 3.23 0.39
Cluster V 0.61 0.54 9.15 1.78
Mean (unweighted average) 13.85 2.46 15.36 3.14 11.84 1.81 10.93 1.56
1 DoR = degree of restriction.
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certi¯cate for secondary education
4 Cluster according to the classi¯cation as described in table B.1
39Tab. A.6: Mean Standardised Bias in the
Seven Clusters1
Men Women
Cluster
Before
Matching
After
Matching
Before
Matching
After
Matching
Ia 13.19 4.50 14.09 4.16
Ib 13.33 3.47 11.64 2.34
Ic 15.59 6.91 11.79 5.77
II 17.39 3.65 15.71 5.55
III 16.90 4.29 20.30 4.53
IV 16.55 8.21 22.79 12.24
V 14.21 10.00 18.62 10.62
Standardised bias before matching calculated as: 100 ¢
(X1 ¡ X0)=f
p
(V1(X) + V0(X))=2g.
Standardised bias after matching calculated as: 100 ¢
(X1M ¡ X0M)=f
p
(V1M(X) + V0M(X))=2g.
1 Mean standardised bias has been calculated as an un-
weighted average of all covariates.
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47B Regional Clusters
To account for the situation on the regional labour market we use the classi¯cation of similar and
comparable labour o±ce districts of the FEA by Blien et al.(2004). The ¯rst group (Ia) contains
the ¯ve East German districts with the worst labour market conditions, characterised by the highest
underemployment, a population density below average and the slightest labour market dynamics.
The 23 `typical' East German labour o±ce districts are pooled in cluster Ib and have high underem-
ployment and minor labour market dynamics. Although the underemployment is above average and
the dynamics are only moderate in labour o±ce districts of cluster Ic, the ¯ve districts have the most
promising labour market situation of East Germany. Cluster II contains 21 labour o±ce districts
dominated by large cities with an above average to a high underemployment, a high population den-
sity, moderate labour market dynamics, a high number of welfare recipients and an above average
tertiarisation of jobs. Except the labour o±ce of Dresden, all districts are in West Germany. The
majority of West German labour o±ce districts (63) belong to cluster III. An average to an above
average underemployment, little labour market dynamics and a low population density characterise
these districts with rural elements and medium-sized industry. Cluster IV pools West German labour
o±ce districts with advantageous labour market prospects. These are ten big city districts with the
highest labour market dynamics, an underemployment below average, a high tertiarisation of jobs,
but also an above average number of welfare recipients. The last cluster (V) contains the 46 labour
o±ce districts with the best labour market situation. Underemployment and also the number of
welfare recipients is the lowest in Germany.
Tab. B.1: Classi¯cation of labour o±ce districts in Germany
Number of Number of participants
Cluster Description districts Men in % Women in %
Ia East German labour o±ce districts with
worst labour market conditions
5 696 13.7 1,232 20.2
Ib East German labour o±ce districts with
bad labour market conditions
23 1,829 36.1 3,234 53.1
Ic East German labour o±ce districts with
high unemployment
5 324 6.4 490 8.1
II
1 Labour o±ce districts dominated by large
cities
21 902 17.8 422 6.9
III West German labour o±ce districts with
rural elements, medium-sized industry and
average unemployment
63 820 16.2 418 6.9
IV West German centers with good labour
market prospects
10 184 3.6 81 1.3
V
2 West German labour o±ce districts with
the best labour market prospects
47 309 6.1 210 3.5
Total Number of Participants 5,064 100 % 6,087 100%
1 Labour o±ce districts of Berlin belong to type II. Since we do not consider these districts
in the empirical analysis, they are not enlisted here.
2 Our dataset contains no information on participants in the labour o±ce district of
DonauwÄ orth. Therefore, this district is excluded from the classi¯cation.
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